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Abstract 
This article develops a general framework to describe the changes in university IPR 
regulations in Europe and their effects on the patenting activities of universities and 
on knowledge transfer processes. Understanding the effects of changes in IPR 
regulations on academic patenting is a complex issue, and parallels with the US case 
can be misleading. First, despite the general trend towards institutional ownership, 
university IPR regulations in Europe remain extremely differentiated and there is no 
one-to-one mapping to the US system. Second, it is difficult to disentangle the 
quantitative and qualitative effects of changes in IPR ownership regulations on 
academic patenting activities from the effects of concurrent transformations in the 
institutional, cultural and organizational landscape surrounding academic knowledge 
transfer. The article proposes a review and typological classification of national 
university IPR ownership systems on the basis of their development since 2000, and 
uses it to analyze the aggregate dynamics of academic patent ownership in several 
European countries. The analysis of patterns of ownership of academic patents shows 
that there has been a general increase in university patenting since 1990, with a 
significant slowdown (and even reduction in some countries) after early 2000s 
accompanied by a switch in academic patents ownership in favor of university 
ownership though preserving the European specificity of high company ownership of 
academic invented patents.  
Keywords: academic patenting, university-owned patents, university-invented 
patents, intellectual property rights regulation, university-industry knowledge transfer 
JEL: I23; O31; O34 
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1. Introduction 
Over time, in most European countries, universities have become increasingly 
involved in the management of the inventions produced by their staff. In particular, 
the patenting of such inventions is increasingly advocated as a strategy to improve the 
immediacy and effectiveness of knowledge transfer from academia to industry, and in 
turn to promote the universities’ ability to  contribute to social and economic 
innovation and development. 
 
While the characteristics of processes of knowledge transfer through patents are 
affected by numerous issues, one key aspect common to all jurisdictions is the 
ownership of the intellectual property rights (IPR) on research results. Since the end 
of the 1990s, most European countries have been moving away from inventor 
ownership of patent rights towards different systems of institutional ownership. 
Inventor ownership (or professor’s privilege) describes a situation where the results of 
publicly-funded research created or developed by researchers are owned by the 
researcher and not by the institution where the research is carried out; institutional 
ownership means that the results of publicly-funded research are instead owned by the 
institution employing the researcher responsible for the work.  
 
In Europe, professor’s privilege prevailed in the German-speaking and Scandinavian 
countries: it allowed university professors to retain patent and utility model rights 
over their research results, while the inventions of scientists employed in public 
research laboratories or private industry belonged by default to their employer. 
Denmark was the first country to decide, in 2000, to abolish professor’s privilege in 
favor of institutional ownership, followed by Germany, Austria, Norway and Finland 
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in the period 2001-2007. In other countries like France and the UK, where 
institutional ownership was already in place, universities were encouraged to enforce 
such rights. These initiatives were driven by the shared objective to imitate conditions 
in the US, where, since the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, universities have been allowed to 
retain IPR on the inventions resulting from federally funded research.  
 
While some recent literature has begun to investigate changes in the systems 
regulating the ownership of university IPR in Europe and the quantitative and 
qualitative effects of such changes on the patenting of inventions emerging from 
academic research, we are still quite far from a complete understanding of these 
phenomena. The objective of this paper is to develop a general framework to think 
about how IPR regulations are changing and what are their effects on the patenting 
activities of universities and on knowledge transfer processes. We show that 
understanding the effects of changes in IPR regulations on academic patenting is a 
complex issue and that parallels with the US example can be misleading. First, we 
show how, despite the general trend towards institutional ownership, university IPR 
regulations in Europe remain extremely differentiated and there is no one-to-one 
mapping to the US system. Nonetheless, it is possible to subsume the historical 
development patterns of the IPR systems of different countries into a small number of 
categories, which can help us to discuss their differences in a more systematic and 
orderly way. This issue is discussed in Section 2, which provides a review and 
typological classification of changes to the regulations on assignment of IPR on 
academic research results since 2000. Second, we provide, in Section 3, an overview 
of the aggregate dynamics of academic patent ownership in several European 
countries, reviewing and integrating data from several sources and highlighting 
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emerging quantitative patterns. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss how it is very 
difficult to disentangle the quantitative and qualitative effects of changes in IPR 
ownership regulations on academic patenting activities from the effects of concurrent 
transformations in the institutional, cultural and organizational landscape surrounding 
academic knowledge transfer. This complexity calls for specific country based 
analyses to fully understand the impact of IPR regulations on academic 
patenting.  
Table 1. Ownership of IPRs at universities in selected European countries 
Country Institution Inventor 
Austria  (2002)  
Belgium  (1997/98)  
Czech Republic  (1990)  
Denmark  (2000)  
Finland  (2007/2010) ◊ 
France  (1982)  
Germany  (2002) ◊ 
Greece  (1995) ◊ 
Hungary  (2006)  
Italy   (2001/2005) 
Netherlands  (1995) ◊ 
Norway  (2002)  
Poland  (2000)  
Slovak Republic  (2000)  
Slovenia  (2006)  
Spain  (1986)  
Sweden   (1949) 
Switzerland  (1911)  
UK  (1977/1985)  
◊ : Inventor ownership is assigned on certain types of inventions 
In brackets: years in which last change in regulation took place 
 
2. Regulation changes and university bylaws  
Table 1 presents an overview of the current state of regulations on university 
ownership of IPR1 for a group of European countries. For each country, we report 
whether ownership of the intellectual property (IP) produced by academic researchers 
is vested primarily in the inventor or the institution, and indicate the year when the 
regulation changed. The information in Table 1 shows that in Europe, with few 
                                                        
1 The analysis in this paper is limited to patents and does not include other forms of protection such as 
copyrights, design rights and, trademarks. 
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exceptions, the system of institutional ownership of academic patents is the most 
common. The prevalence of this system has increased since 2000, with many 
countries switching from inventor ownership of IPR (or systems where ownership 
was assigned to the State) to institutional ownership. Only two countries, Italy and 
Sweden, maintain systems primarily centered on assigning IPR ownership to the 
inventor. 
 
2.1 A typology of changes in national IPR regulations  
Despite the fact that countries have followed different historical patterns to arrive at 
their current configurations, it is possible to identify a small set of country groups 
based on the evolution of IPR regulations pre and post 2000. This typology (presented 
in Table 2)  identifies five distinct groups based upon (i) the direction of the change in 
IPR ownership after 2000 (from institutional ownership to inventor ownership; from 
inventor ownership to institutional ownership; continuing institutional ownership; 
continuing inventor ownership) and (ii) the tradition of involvement of the university 
in IP management (weak or strong).  
Table 2. A typology of changes in national IPR regulations  
 
Traditional involvement of university in IP 
management 
Strong Weak 
IPR 
ownership 
regulations 
after 2000 
Continuing institutional 
ownership 
UK 
Spain 
Switzerland 
France 
Greece 
From inventor ownership to 
institutional ownership 
 
Germany 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Austria 
From institutional ownership to 
inventor ownership (and back) 
 Italy 
Continuing inventor ownership  Sweden 
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A first group comprises early adopters of the institutional ownership system such as 
the UK, Spain and Switzerland. The UK was one of the first European countries to 
implement university ownership of academic property rights. The Patent Act 1977 
states that an employee invention is owned by the employer (under normal 
circumstances) and there is no special provision for academics.2 From 1948, in the 
UK academic property rights were managed by a government organization: the 
National Research Development Corporation (NRDC). In 1981, NRDC merged with 
the National Enterprise Board to form the British Technology Group (BTG) which 
gained the exclusive rights to commercialize the results of publicly funded research 
till 1985 when UK universities were allowed to decide whether to own and manage 
their patents independently or rely on the services provided by BTG (Macdonald, 
2009). In 1992, BTG was privatized and became a private supplier of IPR brokerage 
services to universities and other companies. Although universities had been allowed 
to claim the rights to their employees’ inventions, it was only after the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry published the White Paper Realizing our Potential 
(DTI, 1993), which called for universities to play a key role in national innovation 
and competitiveness, that university patenting activity began to increase (Macdonald, 
2009). This trend increased up to 2000, with several policy reports and guidelines (see 
Tang, 2008) encouraging universities to adopt a more “commercial” model of 
interaction with external stakeholders. Also Spain should be included in the early 
adopters with a strong university IP management, the framework for scientific and 
patenting activities was established in the 1980s, based on the University Reform Law 
which allowed university researchers to receive income from contracts with firms, 
                                                        
2 However, the application of the rule in respect of university academics has been challenged in court a 
few times and a 2009 decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in University of 
Western Australia v Gray seems not to support its applicability (Pila, 2010).  
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including arrangements that led to patents and licensing (Azagra-Caro, 2010). It 
allowed researchers to add to their income through contract work. The 1986 Law for 
the Promotion and General Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research 
(the “Science Law”) required universities to become better aligned to societal needs 
and economic development in particular, and stated that universities and public 
research organizations retained ownership of their research results. This rendered the 
regulatory framework in Spain very similar to that in the US, although it had not been 
directly inspired by the US model (Azagra-Caro, 2010). 
 
The second group includes countries such as France and Greece, which favored 
institutional ownership, but where its enforcement was weak. In France, historically, 
the main function of the university was education, and the university sector was 
heavily controlled by central government. Beginning in the 1970s, universities’ 
autonomy and involvement in research and interaction with public research institutes 
increased. Professors and teachers had the status of civil servants, which mean that the 
patent rights on their inventions belonged to their employers, the universities. 
However, the universities usually did not retain these rights, since this was considered 
“counter-productive” in terms of knowledge diffusion or attracting industry funding 
(Azagra-Caro, Carayol and Llerena, 2006). In 1999, to try to address the low levels of 
cooperation and knowledge transfer between university and industry, the government 
introduced Public Law 99-597, also known as the Innovation Act. It was aimed at 
increasing universities’ awareness of IPR and facilitating IPR commercialization 
through the creation of a technology transfer infrastructure (Azagra-Caro, Carayol and 
Llerena, 2006).  
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The third group is composed of countries which implemented a strong “professorial 
rights” system – Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Austria – and which in the 
early 2000 modified their IPR regulations to introduce institutional ownership. In 
Germany,  in 2002, the professor’s privilege was abolished (in socialist East Germany 
professorial right did not apply) and universities were given the right to file patents on 
their employees’ inventions, although if they did not do so within a certain period of 
time, the rights revert to the inventor. This change was motivated by a concern among 
policymakers that individual researchers might be unwilling or unable to pursue 
commercial application of their ideas through patenting or licensing activity 
(Czarnitzki, Hussinger and Schneider, 2008). By requiring universities to assign 30% 
of the gross revenue from a patent to the inventor, and to pay all the costs associated 
with patent application, the law was designed to increase the incentives for the 
scientists to disclose their inventions. Similar shifts towards institutional ownership 
have taken place in Austria, Denmark, Finland and Norway.  
 
The fourth group includes a country, Italy, which moved from institutional ownership 
to inventor ownership, bucking the general trend. Legislation on intellectual property 
in Italy dates back to 1939 and assigns ownership of property rights on any invention 
developed by an employee during his or her working time, to the employer (Della 
Malva et al., 2007). Before the 1990s, universities as employers were managed by the 
Ministry of Education and had little decisional or financial autonomy. They were not 
interested in exploiting their IP because until 1996, they received no income from it 
(Baldini et al., 2010). A situation very similar to the French case. New legislation 
introduced in 2001 granted IPR ownership to the researcher/professor, and allowed 
the university to receive a share (between 30% and 50%) of the revenue from patents. 
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If an inventor had not used a patent after five years, the university would be granted a 
free non exclusive license to use the invention. It was assumed that individual 
inventors would be better placed to profit from their discoveries, since universities 
lacked the competence and culture to commercialize inventions (Della Malva et al., 
2007; Baldini et al., 2010). Funnily enough, the exact opposite view justified the 
change of regulation in the German speaking countries in the same period.3 In 2005 
the regulation changed again. Professor’s privilege applies only in the case of research 
that has been fully financed by the institution employing the individual; in the case of 
research that is partly privately funded or funded by government or an international 
government agency, the IPR belongs to the university. Since external funding is very 
important for most research laboratories, this reduces the possibilities for researchers 
to own the IPR to their inventions, and has led to conflict, as it can be difficult to 
directly link a financial input to a specific research output.4  
 
The fifth group includes a country which has chosen to maintain invention ownership 
systems based on professor’s privilege, Sweden. Professor’s privilege was 
implemented in Sweden in 1949 and allows the researcher to receive all the benefits 
from a patent but also to bear all the costs. Although the rules on IPR assignment have 
not changed, the rules for funding of universities (Sellenthin, 2006) and cultural and 
policy attitudes to technology transfer have changed since “third mission” activities 
were formally recognized as compulsory in 1997 (see discussion in section 4). 
                                                        
3 “Ai posteri l’ardua sentenza”, it is for posterity to judge who was right. 
4 Dissatisfaction with this mixed regulation on the part of the professional community has resulted in 
various attempts to re-introduce university ownership rights. In 2006/07 and again in 2010 a regulation 
that would assign full patent rights to the university went through the parliamentary procedure, only to 
be rejected at the final implementation stage. 
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Finally, for sake of completeness, European countries belonging to the former 
“Eastern group” should be considered as belonging to a separate group (not discussed 
here): these countries began updating their general patent systems in the early 1990s 
and assigned ownership of academic IPR to universities, in a change from the 
government ownership system typical of the communist period.  
 
Though the typology presented indicates a general trend towards institutional 
ownership, this does not equate to greater homogenization of university IPR 
ownership systems in Europe for two main reasons. First, institutional ownership 
systems are very different from each other with respect to numerous dimensions, and 
so are the two inventor ownership systems (Section 2.2). Second, national regulation 
are modified by the application of university specific bylaws on the allocation of 
patent rights (Section 2.3). 
 
2.2 Differences within national IPR systems 
National IPR systems allowing institutional ownership differ substantially along 
several dimensions. First, in terms of the regulations on academic patenting, the 
system may be regulated by national laws (public research acts or similar), or by 
default (i.e. general laws on IPR ownership). In some cases, non-binding national 
codes of practice have been formulated to provide guidance to universities. Second, 
there are differences in how the rights are vested in the university. Under the “pre-
emption rights” principle, the researcher is the first owner of the invention but the 
university has the right to “claim” the invention within a specified period. In the event 
that the invention is not claimed within the specified period, the rights remain with the 
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inventor. This specified time period varies between 2 and 6 months from notification 
(but in Belgium it is 3 years) (DLA PIPER, Mason Hayes+Currant , 2007). Countries 
with pre-emption rights systems are Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark and Norway. 
Under “automatic ownership”, the university is the first owner of the IPR, which 
usually cannot revert to the inventor. Countries with automatic ownership systems 
include France, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain 
and the UK. Finland, Germany, Greece and Hungary have hybrid systems. Third, the 
type of invention can affect the ownership, in Finland, the law distinguishes between 
inventions coming out of “contract research”, which automatically are assigned to the 
institution, and “open research” (wholly university funded, or where there is an 
agreement with external sponsors to consider the research “open”) which means rights 
belong to the inventor and the institution can acquire them only if the inventor does 
not intend to use or publish them. Thus, Finland’s system can be described as 
“qualified professor’s privilege” (DLA PIPER, Mason Hayes+Currant, 2007), similar 
to the current system in Italy. Germany, Greece and Hungary make a distinction 
between “service inventions” which result from the employee’s activity during the 
term of employment (and which fall under automatic ownership) and “free 
inventions” (or “dependent inventions” or “employee inventions”) which include all 
other inventions (rights are assigned to the inventor and the institution can 
commercialize them under a non-exclusive license).  
 
The two professor’s privilege systems also differ. The scope of professor’s privilege 
in Italy is wider than in Sweden, since it applies to all the employees and potentially 
all consultants and third parties involved in the university research, while in Sweden it 
applies only to teachers, postgraduate students and doctoral candidates. In 2005 Italy 
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reintroduced partial institutional ownership. There are also differences in the 
allocation of the profits deriving from exploitation of an invention, the obligation of 
the researcher to patent, and derogation to the general inventor ownership rule: the 
Italian system is more binding than the Swedish one5. 
 
2.3 University bylaws 
An added complexity in the regulatory framework is that universities can often 
override national regulations in order to negotiate different IPR arrangements with 
third parties: such cases are usually regulated by university bylaws. In most countries, 
if research is sponsored fully or in part by external contractors (e.g. private 
companies) it is possible for parties to negotiate a different agreement on the 
allocation of patent rights between sponsor, university and individual inventor. In 
some cases, the university can override existing national regulations by developing 
internal patent rights regulations and processes for how to enforce them; the most well 
know case is the University of Cambridge that till 2001 did not enforce fully the 
university ownership right (still in 2010 an handful of professors with old contracts 
maintain some inventor’ rights) and had assigned very few patents till 2006.  
 
Since the early 1990s most European universities have been given increased 
autonomy which has allowed them to devise bylaws that apply to the management of 
knowledge transfer. Issues such as the share of royalties to be assigned to the 
employees involved in the invention, the rights of PhD students involved in an 
invention, the baseline for TTO activities, the timing of patent filing procedures, can 
                                                        
5 See DLA PIPER, Mason Hayes+Currant (2007) for a more detailed comparison of the regulations in 
the two systems. 
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vary widely among universities in the same country. The role of university bylaws in 
order to regulate IPR ownership and related conditions is particularly important in 
countries where there is no strong legislative framework regulating academic 
patenting, such as the UK, Ireland and Switzerland, and in countries where the 
national regulatory framework applies only if researchers and other parties have not 
agreed alternative rules, such as Sweden (Sellenthin, 2006); but also in most other 
European countries universities have some flexibility to define internal rules. The 
variety of bylaws is constrained, however, by a process of institutional imitation. For 
example, Baldini et al. (2010), based on an in-depth study of the evolution of Italian 
universities’ patenting regulations, show that most universities tend to adapt the 
patent regulations applying in the prestigious universities, which has led to a fairly 
standardized set of practices. The progressive emergence of a community of 
technology transfer professionals employed by university TTO has led to the creation 
of professional associations which has contributed further to the consolidation of 
these practices.  
 
The analysis of national regulations and university bylaws defining ownership of IPR 
from academic research shows that the shift towards institutional ownership has not 
resulted in greater homogeneity of IPR ownership systems, nor a “one size fits all” 
adaptation of the US framework. Therefore, comparisons with US experience could 
be misleading. In the USA one of the main justifications for the Bayh-Dole Act was 
that government ownership of publicly funded inventions hampered their 
commercialization, and the Act placed the property rights nearer to the inventor 
(Mowery and Sampat, 2005). However, in Germany, Denmark and Norway, for 
example, academic inventors owned the IPR, and the abolition of professor’s 
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privilege had the effect of placing IPR ownership further away from the inventor. 
Even in countries like France or Italy, where institutional ownership existed before 
2000 but where universities were not enforcing it, it could be argued that in practice 
the management of the IP was directly in the hands of the inventor, so that a shift to 
institutional ownership would remove it away from the inventor’s control. The 
possibility for the inventor to dispose of his or her IP (due either to law or custom) is 
likely to have fostered a different system of relationships between the inventor, the 
university and industry, with respect to countries where institutional ownership has 
traditionally been present and enforced.  
 
3. Academic Patenting: The evidence 
Previous work (Geuna and Nesta, 2006) has pointed out the scarce availability of 
statistical information on academic patenting in Europe, the situation has much 
improved since then, but it is still far from optimal. Here we organize a set of 
disparate sources (public and not) to provide the best possible evidence on European 
academic patenting and its evolution during the last twenty or so years. We consider 
both (a) patents owned/applied for by a university or other higher education 
institution - university-owned patents and (b) patents that have one or more university 
researcher in the list of the inventors but which are owned/applied for by some other 
individual or organization (e.g. company, government agency, non-profit 
organization) - university-invented patents (Geuna and Nesta, 2006). Following 
Lissoni et al. (2008), academic patenting refers to both forms of patenting, while 
university patenting refers exclusively to patents directly owned/applied for by a 
university. 
 
 16 
Official data on university-owned patents are produced by the EU, OECD, national 
government agencies and TTO associations. None of these sources makes available 
time series data that are comparable across countries. The only public database 
available online is the Eurostat Science and Technology database6 which provides 
information on patent counts (based on patent applications to the European Patent 
Office (EPO) by priority year at national level) across countries starting from the late 
1990s. Table 3 presents a preliminary overview of the changes in university patenting 
in Europe between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s for a selected sample of 
European countries, and the US (as a benchmark). Most countries show a remarkable 
increase in university patenting, with output in the EU-27 doubling, although there are 
a few exceptions. Sweden and the US present negative growth and the Netherlands 
and the UK present only weak growth. These results are confirmed by OECD data on 
the share of patents owned by universities in international Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) filings with EPO designations, for 1995-1997 and 2003-2005 (OECD, 2008).  
Table 3. Patents owned by HEI 
 04-06
(p)
 01-03 98-00 
European Union (27 countries) 1059 796 573 
Euro area (15 countries) 756 480 311 
Denmark 31 17 5 
Germany (including ex-GDR from 1991) 252 135 61 
Spain 51 32 21 
France 117 84 46 
Italy 78 46 24 
Netherlands 68 61 52 
Austria 25 2 3 
Sweden 2 5 5 
United Kingdom 256 284 245 
Norway 7 1 1 
Switzerland 79 59 47 
United States 1265 1172 1320 
Source: Elaboration of Eurostat data 
(p): Provisional values for 2006. 
 
                                                        
6
 Accessible from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu (last accessed 4/10/2010). 
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The most reliable national government agency data on university-owned patents are 
those collected in the UK. These data are used by the Higher Education Funding 
Councils to allocate third stream funding to universities. The annual HE-BCI survey 
provides information on disclosures, patent applications, patent granted, licenses, 
spin-offs, income, etc. Table 4 presents the evolution of a subset of indicators for the 
period 2003-04 / 2008-09. Patents applied for and granted (both national and 
international filings but not counting multiple filings of the same patent in different 
countries) show average increases of some 10% and 7% respectively, while new spin-
offs have grown more slowly. Total income from IP increased at about 12% per year 
generally, excluding the exceptionally good performance of the last year (see note 
below table). However, if we compare total funding from collaborative research, 
contract research and consultancy, with income from IP we see that the latter is very 
small, accounting for only 3% to 4% of other research-related sources. Also, 
compared to other research related funding sources, such as income from facilities 
and equipment services (e.g. renting a microscope for an experiment), IP income was 
between 33% and 66% lower during the whole period (excluding the last year). 
Table 4. Summary indicators of IPR related activities in UK universities 
 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09* 
Patent applications 1,308 1,648 1,536 1,913 1,898 2,097 
Patents granted 463 711 577 647 590 653 
Formal spin-offs established 167 148 187 226 219 191 
Formal spin-offs still active after 3 
years 
688 661 746 844 923 982 
IP income 43 63 63 61 68 124§ 
Other income 1,508 1,518 1,612 1,829 1,910 2,001 
Source: HEBCI Surveys - http://www.hefce.ac.uk/econsoc/buscom/hebci/ 
£Millions  
*Survey conducted by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) with some inconsistencies with 
previous years, especially with regard to IP income  
§
About 42% of the increase on previous year is due to one UK university selling its share of a well-
established company (HEFCE, 2010) 
 
Data on university-owned patents are collected also by national and international TTO 
associations. Two of them, the European Knowledge Transfer Association (ProTon) 
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and the Association of European Science and Technology Transfer Professionals 
(ASTP), have international membership, but neither is representative of the European 
university population. For example, for the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 ProTon 
surveyed respectively 323 and 305 European universities (mostly from Denmark, 
Italy, Spain and the UK), while ASTP included only 140 and 99 responses from the 
best performers in Europe (Piccaluga and Pietrabissa, 2010; Proton, 2009). Using 
information from Piccaluga and Pietrabissa (2010) and Proton (2009) we can compile 
information from five ProTon surveys (from 2004 to 2008) and three ASTP surveys 
(2006 and 2007). In the ProTon survey, the total number of priority patent application 
increased from 943, to 3,304 in 2007 (and 2,951 in 2008) mainly due to the entry of 
new TTO in the survey: the average number of applications per TTO office declined 
then increased to 10.7 in 2007 (and 10.0 in 2008). The total number of patents granted 
increased similarly, from 123 in 2004 to 1,173 in 2007 (but was only 710 in 2008) 
and the number of patents granted per TTO increased from 2.1 to 4.0 in 2007 (but was 
only 3.4 in 2008). Average licensing revenues per TTO decreased from €375,800 to 
€212,600 in 2007 (increasing to €246,900 in 2008 driven mainly by the previously 
described UK performance). The ASTP survey shows important absolute increases 
(due to the increasing number of respondents) for total patent applications and patents 
granted, up to 2007, but only a modest increase in the total number of patents per 
TTO. ASTP data report average licensing revenues for the fiscal year 2007 of 
€929,200 confirming the sample selection bias of this survey in favor of high 
performing TTO. Note, though, that although informative, these data should be 
treated with caution as it is not clear what they represent. Although in the ProTon 
survey the number of respondents increased this is far from being representative of 
European universities. It might be interesting to compare these data with data from 
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the US Association of University Technology Manager (AUTM), although theAUTM 
sample for fiscal year 2007 included only 194 respondents (mainly research-intensive 
institutions) out of more than 3,600 higher education institutions in the US. The data 
for TTO show that US organizations on average have 18.8 patents granted with 
average licensing revenue per TTO of €10,126,500, much better performance than 
achieved by European TTO. However, US TTO are performing only slightly better 
than European TTO for number of spin-offs created – in both absolute numbers and 
per TTO. 
 
This evidence and that provided by most of published studies, indicate that the total 
number of patents owned by European universities has increased quite dramatically 
since 2000. This is also due to the entry of new actors (more universities with active 
TTO) and improved performance from existing TTO. The increase is greater for 
countries with more recently established knowledge transfer infrastructures, for 
example, the number of university-owned patents increased between the mid-1990s 
and the mid-2000s in Italy and France (Baldini, Grimaldi and Sobrero, 2006; Della 
Malva, Lissoni and Llerena, 2008). The data also show that the patenting and 
licensing performance of European TTO is lower than that of the US organizations 
included in the AUTM survey, but it should be noted that the difference in the 
samples of institutions included in the various European surveys and the US AUTM 
survey reduces drastically the comparability.  
 
Due to the special role of university-invented patents in Europe, the above 
information is biased in terms of both the overall assessment of patenting activities in 
European universities and the changes over time, affecting in a significant way the 
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comparison with the USA. Statistics on university-owned patents generally 
underestimate academics’ patenting activity and this is more severe for Europe than 
for the US (Crespi, Geuna and Verspagen, 2006). For example, Lissoni et al. (2008) 
show that university-owned patents in France, Italy and Sweden constitute no more 
than 11% of all academic patents (69% in the US). Statistical information on 
university-invented patents have been collected in various European countries in 
recent years, and there is an ongoing effort to standardize the different national 
databases, based on the guidelines developed for the KEINS database (Lissoni et al., 
2008), which matches names of university scientists with the lists of inventors on 
EPO patent applications.7 Quasi-standardized information is available for Denmark, 
France, Italy, and Sweden8 while work is ongoing in The Netherlands and for a 
sample of UK scientists.9 We complement this information with data on 43,000 
academic patent applications to the German Patent and Trademark Office (Frietsch et 
al., 2010).10  
 
Table 5 combines these data, as well as it is possible, to provide an estimate of shares 
of academic patents in Europe according to ownership, and changes in the period 
1980-2006. Ownership is classified as university-owned, university-invented owned 
                                                        
7 This approach underestimates the real relevance of university-invented patents since it is confined to 
researchers that are still active. 
8
 For further information on current developments see the European Science Foundation supported 
project Academic Patenting in Europe (http://www.esf-ape-inv.eu/index.php).  
9
 We thank Valerio Sterzi for allowing access to information collected by him on a sample of 1,666 
EPO academic patents for the period 1978-2002. 
10 We thank Ulrich Schmoch for providing access to German data. The sample of patents for 1990-
2007 was built on the basis of the title “Professor” before the name of the inventor. This may 
underestimate the number of academic patents because it does not take account of academic 
researchers that do not hold chairs. It may also provide an overestimation since it includes honorary 
professors no longer working in a higher education institution. Evidence from the data by specific 
fields/universities indicate that underestimation is the more important phenomenon. 
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by an individual, and university-invented owned by a company. These categories do 
not sum to 100 as university-invented patents can also be owned by other 
organizations such as government, or public research and non-for-profit 
organizations. We focus on three time periods, with the most recent one 2002-2006 
after the change of IPR regulation in Denmark and Germany; we also report the 
statistics for the period 1994-2001 for which are available in all the seven countries 
considered.  
Table 5. Ownership structure of academic patents in selected countries / years 
 1981-1985 1996-2000 2002-2006 1994-2001 
 Owned Invented Owned Invented Owned Invented Owned Invented 
  Indi Comp  Indi Comp  Indi Comp  Indi Comp 
Dk       20# 6# 73# 11° 20° 66° 
F  5  1  25  12  3  60    10 4 61 
G 4§ 32§ 64§ 6   35 59   25 19 56 6 34 60 
I  3  12  63  11  7  72    10 9 72 
NL          26 2 60 
Sw  7  27  63  5  12  81    5 13 81 
UK 9 19 40 41 8 45      40 6 48 
§
 : 1990; 
+
 : 1991-2001; 
#
 : 2000-2003; °: 1994-2003;. 
 : Approximation 
 
The information in Table 5 confirms that the large majority of academic patents in 
Europe are not owned by universities, even for the most recent years; university-
invented patents owned by companies are still prominent in all countries, ranging 
from 50% to 80% of total academic patents. Only in the case of the UK, since the mid 
1990s, universities owns about 40% of the patents invented by their researchers, 
consistently with the UK being a country which in our typology has a tradition of 
institutional management of IPR. Looking at the change in time, the share of 
university-owned patents has increased in all countries. In France and Italy this is due 
mainly to a decrease in the share of government/other PRO ownership, while in 
Germany and Denmark, especially in the period 2002-2006, increased university 
 22 
ownership is linked mainly to lower levels of individual ownership, and lower levels 
of business ownership in Germany.  
 
For Germany, Frietsch et al. (2010) and von Ledebur, Buenstrof and Hummel (2009). 
provide evidence of an overall decrease in the number of academic patents after 2000. 
They find that university owned-patents slightly displaced business-owned patents 
and, since this affects both first-time and experienced inventors, this might indicate 
that established science-industry links have been disturbed by the new legislation. 
Von Ledebur, Buenstrof and Hummel (2009) suggest that the presence of a third 
party, the university, in IPR negotiations, raises transaction costs for firms and is a 
deterrent to collaboration.11 For Denmark instead, Lissoni et al. (2009) show that the 
share of university-owned patents has increased at the expense of individually-owned 
patents, but the share of business-owned academic patents slightly increased.  
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that the increase in university-owned patents has been 
at the expense of inventor-owned and other public organization owned patents; the 
situation for business-owned patents is less straightforward. Company ownership of 
academic patents remained generally very important after the shift to an institutional 
IPR ownership system, even where a small displacement effect occurred. Baldini, 
Grimaldi and Sobrero (2006) suggest that the fact that many patents continue to be 
assigned to businesses even when universities are legally allowed to retain the IPR on 
these inventions might be indicative of the smaller bargaining power of European 
universities compared to US universities, with respect to industry, and of their lack of 
                                                        
11
 However, the database used by Von Ledebur, Buenstorf and Hummel does not include academics 
who have never appeared on a university-owned patent and, thus, may overestimate the displacement 
effect of university ownership. 
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ability or inclination to apply for patents on academic discoveries. On the other hand, 
it might be that it is the university TTO that are making the decision not to proceed 
with a patent application and to transfer the rights back to the researcher. Finally, 
inventors can stop the university from taking over the rights to inventions by 
transferring them to a third party in defiance of the university’s rules (Argyres and 
Liebeskind, 1998) or because the invention was developed through consulting 
activity.  
 
The above evidence points to the specificities of the European situation compared to 
the US and to the impossibility of generalizing the results for one country or group of 
countries, to the rest of Europe, since rules and regulatory frameworks vary widely. 
The evidence suggests that academic patenting is generally growing driven mainly by 
an increase in university-owned patents in the followers countries. However, in a few 
countries, such as Germany, where academic patenting was well established, there is 
evidence of a decrease or stagnation in overall academic patenting (increase in 
university-owned patents associated with a decrease in university-invented patents) 
from the mid 2000s. There is also evidence of a leveling off (and even decrease) in 
the growth of university-owned patents in countries, such as the UK, which have a 
longer tradition of institutional ownership. These results may suggests that, 
consistently with the evidence in the US, university researchers and universities are 
becoming less prone to rely upon  patents as a channel for knowledge transfer.  
 
4. Regulations, policy incentives, cultural change and their impact on academic 
patenting 
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Although there is cross country evidence that the number of university-owned patents 
has increased overall, we cannot ascribe this phenomenon only to changes in IPR 
legislation because the switch to university-ownership systems has been accompanied 
by other changes which could have helped to trigger an increase in university 
patenting.  
 
The changes in IPR regulations have taken place against a changing cultural  and 
organizational background. On the one hand, patenting and knowledge transfer are 
increasingly acknowledged as legitimate and important academic activities: in the 
“entrepreneurial” university model, it is acceptable for academics to engage in 
commercially-oriented transactions (Clark, 1998; Etzkowitz, 2002). On the other 
hand, policies have been implemented at the regional, national and European 
Community levels to support the creation of a knowledge transfer infrastructure.  
 
Independently from the group in the typology, all countries have launched support  
policies. For example, in the first group, the UK adopted a unique approach to 
technology transfer. Entrepreneurial activities in universities began to increase in the 
mid-1980s (Meyer and Tang, 2007), when heavy budget cuts forced universities to 
adopt more proactive approaches to revenue generation, which included the 
establishment of TTO. In the mid-1990s, government began actively supporting 
university “third mission” activities (Meyer and Tang, 2007). The main policy 
instrument was allocation of Higher Education Funding Council funds through calls 
for tender under various schemes for seed funding and entrepreneurial activity and the 
creation of official “third stream” funding for knowledge transfer activities, allocated 
on the basis of knowledge transfer performance measured by the annual Higher 
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Education-Business and Community Interaction (HE-BCI) survey. In the third group, 
in Germany the switch to institutional ownership of academic IPR was complemented 
by substantial federal subsidies for regional patent exploitation institutions, which 
were seen as a more efficient way to deal with the increased patenting and licensing 
activities expected with the change in legislation (Bielig and Haase, 2004, cited in von 
Ledebur et al., 2009). In Norway the switch to institutional ownership was 
accompanied by the expansion of the universities’ and colleges’ responsibilities to 
include “third mission” activities, and by the setting up of a technology transfer 
infrastructure composed of university TTO, and instruments such as seed capital 
funding, mostly provided by government (Iversen, Gulbrandsen and Klitkou, 2007). 
The Danish government also provided substantial funding for the creation of a 
technology transfer infrastructure following the introduction of institutional 
ownership (Lissoni et al, 2009). Also in the countries of the forth and fifth groups 
where the Professor’s privilege was enforced policies supporting university 
knowledge transfer were developed. In Sweden, numerous organizations to support 
technology transfer were established in the 1990s: a series of technology bridging 
foundations was founded to help universities build links with industry and other 
stakeholders; science parks were established with public funding; national 
competence centers12 were financed jointly by industry, university and government; 
and universities set up their own TTO. In Italy, from the late 1990s, universities began 
putting in place mechanisms to commercialize research results, ranging from TTO to 
university incubators. By 2007, almost all Italian universities had a dedicated TTO 
(Balderi et al., 2009). The evidence that Italy experienced an important increase in 
university-owned patents despite Italian legislation having moved towards professor’s 
                                                        
12 The patent rights on the results of collaborative research conducted in competence centers are 
exempt from professor’s privilege and are vested in the collaborating firms (Sellenthin, 2006). 
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privilege is probably the best indication that policy incentives and cultural change are 
more important than the switch to institutional IPR ownership per se.  
 
A few detailed empirical studies of changes of regulations and policy implementation 
at the country level confirm this result.  Cesaroni and Piccaluga (2003) analyze the 
patenting activities of Italian, French and Spanish universities and other PRO and 
show that patent policies are one of the determinants of inter-country and inter-
organizational differences. Baldini, Grimaldi and Sobrero (2006) suggest that in in 
Italy university bylaws are an important determinant of patenting activity. Baldini 
(2009), analyzing the Danish case, suggests that the change from elected researcher-
managers to an appointed board consisting of a majority of members from outside 
academia, and the implementation of performance contracts and quantitative and 
measurable indicators of a university’s work and results, helped the Danish academic 
community to raise awareness of and increase support for technology transfer among 
its members and hence played a role in stimulating patenting activity. Della Malva, 
Lissoni and Llerena (2008) find that the French Innovation Act significantly increased 
the likelihood of an academic patent being assigned to a university rather than to a 
company, but also suggest that the opening of a TTO at a university has a stronger 
and more significant impact on the decision of the university to retain the IPR on its 
scientists’ discoveries. Particularly interesting is the interaction between change of 
regulation and incentive. Von Ledebur (2009), using German data, suggests that the 
switch from professor’s privilege to institutional ownership has led to an increase in 
university patent ownership by universities that set up a TTO (and began to patent) 
only after 2002. Those universities with longer established TTO were patenting more 
even under the professor’s privilege system. This suggest that it was not so much the 
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change in IPR ownership regulations that led to an increase in university patenting, 
but that this change motivated universities that previously had not patented, to 
establish a technology transfer infrastructure.  
 
These empirical analyses highlight that, in Europe, the organizational and cultural 
changes that have accompanied the changes to the regulations on IPR ownership at 
universities, have had a major impact on university patenting activity, and an even 
greater impact than the changes in the regulations on their own (Geuna and Muscio, 
2009). The regulation changes and especially the substantial public investment in 
policies for knowledge transfer, have provided incentives for universities to develop 
their knowledge transfer support functions. 
 
Finally, but most importantly, it is worth examining whether the increase in 
university-owned patents has a positive impact on the use of new university 
inventions by companies. Only very few studies have attempted to perform this 
analysis. Using citation counts, Czarnitzki, Hussinger and Schneider (2008) show that 
academic patents have more forward citations compared to non-academic ones and, 
therefore, appear to generate greater knowledge externalities (i.e. they are of “higher 
quality”). However, they find that the “quality” of academic patents has declined 
since the mid-1990s. The authors suggest that changes in funding rules and the 
increasingly commercial orientation of universities are encouraging academics to 
patent all their discoveries regardless of their importance, which is leading to “lower 
quality” patents, a trend that is being reinforced by the abolition of the professor’s 
privilege. Using forward citations, Lissoni, Montobbio and Seri (2010) show for 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden that university-owned patents 
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have a lower hazard rate than company-owned academic patents, indicating a lower 
number of forward citations (lower “quality”) all else being equal. Finally, Crespi, 
Geuna and Verspagen (2006) using a set of indicators for the commercialization of 
innovations show that, in the case of the sample of academic patents included in 
Patval survey, university-owned patents do not have a higher probability of being 
used. Consistent with the results in Lissoni, Montobbio and Seri (2010), they find that 
university-ownership is associated with better use, compared to individual ownership. 
These three studies provide a consistent and negative picture of the use/quality of 
academic patents owned by a university compared to academic patents owned by a 
company (but not by individuals). This should be taken account of when considering 
the positive assessment usually associated with increased university-owned patents 
since the changes to the regulations and the policy interventions introduced in various 
countries.     
 
5. Conclusions 
While the characteristics of national university-industry technology transfer are 
affected by many elements, one of the main ones is the system of rules regulating IPR 
ownership of the results of academic research. As the review of IPR regulations in 
Section 2 demonstrates, institutional ownership now applies to most European 
countries however, the general shift towards institutional ownership has not produced 
greater homogeneity among IPR ownership systems, since national regulations 
defining ownership of IPR from academic research vary widely. It has not resulted 
either in a “one size fits all” adaptation of the US framework, and very few European 
countries have followed the path taken by the US since the Bayh-Dole Act. Therefore, 
comparisons with US experience could be misleading and cannot be used to predict 
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the evolving features of institutional IPR ownership systems in Europe. Ad-hoc 
analyses of academic IPR ownership patterns in individual European countries (and of 
their effects on other variables) are necessary in order to understand how these 
systems are evolving. 
 
The US experiences is also unlikely to provide, on its own, a guide to understand the 
effects of a shift towards institutional ownership on academic patenting activities. The 
effects of changes in IPR regulations differ across countries and are not clearly 
attributable to the regulations alone. The right for universities in many countries to 
override national regulations in order to negotiate different IPR arrangements with 
third parties adds further complexity, as does the fact that changes in IPR regulations 
have taken place against a changing organizational and cultural background, where 
patenting and knowledge transfer are increasingly acknowledged as legitimate and 
important academic activities, and where policies have been implemented to support 
of the creation of a knowledge transfer infrastructure. 
 
The evidence presented in this paper, and that from most recent studies, highlights 
some common developments in most European countries. First, there are indications 
that the total number of patents owned by universities increased rapidly in the first 10 
years of the new millennium, due to the entry of new actors (more universities with 
active TTO) and improved performance of existing TTO. Second, the increase has 
been larger in those countries that were late in developing an infrastructure for 
knowledge transfer. Third, patenting and licensing performance of European TTO 
appears lower than that of the US organizations included in the AUTM survey, 
however comparability is extremely weak since AUTM includes mainly research 
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intensive institutions and European TTOs manage only a small portion of academic 
patents. The most recent data (till 2006) on university-invented patents in a selected 
set of European countries show that university-invented patents owned by businesses 
still play an extremely important role in all countries. There are indications also that 
university-owned patents have increased in some countries, at the expense of 
individually-owned and business-owned (but university-invented) patents. If 
academic patenting data are corrected to account for university-invented patents, then 
for some countries with long traditions of academic patenting (such as Germany) and 
for some scientific/technological fields where academic patenting has been 
particularly important (such as biotechnology), we find evidence of a leveling off or 
decrease in the total number of academic patents applications by mid 2000s. Also, in 
countries with a longer tradition of institutional ownership such as the UK, there is 
evidence of a leveling off in university patents consistent with the view of TTOs 
moving away from patenting and emphasizing startups more (Sigel, Veugelers and 
Wright, 2007).  
 
The typology of national experiences presented in Table 2 can provide some help in 
analyzing these complex system. In countries where university enforcement of IPR 
has traditionally been weak – either because of the professor’s privilege or because of 
the lack of interest in IP commercialization on the part of university institutions – 
academic inventors have traditionally patented their inventions individually or 
assigned IPR ownership to collaborating firms. In these contexts, regulations and 
bylaws enforcing university ownership may increase university-owned patents at the 
expense of university-invented patents. Care must be taken therefore not to disrupt 
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pre-existing functioning knowledge transfer relationships between academic inventors 
and firms.  
 
Moreover, numerous empirical analyses seem to suggest that the key determinant of 
increasing enforcement of IPR ownership on the part of universities has been not so 
much the change in IPR ownership in itself, but the creation of an infrastructure for 
knowledge transfer involving an active role of university institutions. This explains 
why increases in university-owned patents have taken place also in countries where 
the IPR ownership regime has not changed (or where it has changed towards 
professor’s privilege). There may be however an indirect effect of the change in 
regulation where the latter has stimulated the development of a knowledge transfer 
infrastructure. We believe that detailed country-level studies on the interplay of 
changes in IPR regulations and in technology transfer policies and university bylaws 
can further help to disentangle these effects. 
 
This analysis suggests caution in expecting immediate and extensive effects on 
academic patenting from changes to the legislation alone, and at the same time it 
advises policymakers not to overlook the systemic implications of individual policy 
interventions aimed at supporting knowledge transfer. Moreover, it casts doubts on 
the overall beneficial effects of an increase in university patent ownership in terms of 
greater contribution of university research to economic development, since the 
evidence discussed in this paper indicates that higher university ownership is not 
correlated with higher use of/higher quality academic patents. 
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